Revisiting Germany\u27s \u3cem\u3eResidenzpflicht\u3c/em\u3e in Light of Modern E.U. Asylum Law by McDonough, Paul
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 30 Issue 2 
2009 
Revisiting Germany's Residenzpflicht in Light of Modern E.U. 
Asylum Law 
Paul McDonough 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the European Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the Immigration Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul McDonough, Revisiting Germany's Residenzpflicht in Light of Modern E.U. Asylum Law, 30 MICH. J. 
INT'L L. 515 (2009). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol30/iss2/5 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
STUDENT NOTE
REVISITING GERMANY'S RESIDENZPFLICHT
IN LIGHT OF MODERN E.U. ASYLUM LAW
Paul McDonough*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ............................... 518
A. The 1951 Refugee Convention ........................................... 518
B. The Residenzpflicht ........................................................... 519
C. German Law in the European Order ................................. 520
D. E. U. Competence over Asylum Law ................................... 522
E. The Reception D irective ..................................................... 525
II. RESIDENZPFLICHT, THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE,
AND REFUGEES "LAWFULLY IN" GERMANY ............................. 527
A. The Reception Directive and Free Movement
Under Article 26 of the Refugee Convention ..................... 528
B. Refugees in the German Status Determination
Process Are Lawfully Present ............................................ 531
III. FREE MOVEMENT RIGHTS FOR IRREGULARLY
A RRIVING REFUGEES ................................................................ 534
A. Convention Article 31 's Protections of Free Movement .... 535
B. "Regularization" Lifts Even "Necessary" Restrictions
of M ovem ent ...................................................................... 536
IV. POSSIBLE AVENUES OF LEGAL CHALLENGE TO
THE RESIDENZPFLICHT ............................................................. 539
A. Remedies Under European Law: Jurisdiction ................... 539
B. Interpretation ofArticle 7 of the Reception Directive ....... 541
V. CONCLUSION: CAN THE ECJ EXPAND REFUGEE
RIGHTS IN G ERMANY? ........................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545
Human rights norms remain aspirational, conditional, or discretion-
ary. By contrast, the 1951 Refugee Convention enumerates rights that
reflect legally binding duties assumed by the signatory States.' The Con-
vention recognizes a range of rights that develop over time as the
refugee's connection to the host society deepens. Refugees "lawfully in"
a State Party's territory have the right to free movement throughout the
State's territory, and to choose their place of residence 2 Even refugees
who enter, or are found unlawfully within, the State, possess the right to
* J.D., The University of Michigan Law School, 2007.
1. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6577, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. States may, however, apply to lawfully pre-
sent refugees "any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances." Id.
2. Id. art. 26.
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free movement if "they present themselves without delay to the authori-
ties and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence."3
Yet, in 1982, Germany, a Convention signatory, instituted the Resi-
denzpflicht (residence duty),4 one of the developed world's "most
notorious" regimes restricting the residence and movement of refugees
Under this system of dispersing physical and administrative responsibili-
ties among the German Ldnder (states),6 asylum seekers are assigned
residences and may not leave the surrounding Landkreis (local adminis-
trative district) without permission until their claims are finally
resolved .
Although the Refugee Convention is binding on States and recog-
nizes individuals' rights, no international body holds the competence to
adjudicate its terms except as between signatory States.8 Refugees, thus,
lack a direct route to redress infringements of their individual rights un-
der the Convention before an international tribunal, which leaves the
question of whether the Residenzpflicht comports with international law
to the German national courts. The Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court, has upheld the central provisions of
the Residenzpflicht against numerous challenges.9
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in the
2007 case of Omwenyeke v. Germany, upheld the Residenzpflicht against
an asserted violation of the right to free movement.' ° The European
Union's assumption of partial competence over asylum in the early
3. Id. art. 31(1) (defining the class covered by the right to free movement in Article
31(2)).
4. Asylverfahrensgesetz [Asylum Procedure Act], July 16, 1982 BGBI. I at 946, § 20
(ER.G.).
5. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 701
(2005).
6. See Bundesministerium des Innern [Federal Ministry of the Interior], Asyl, FlUcht-
lingsschutz und subsidiarer Schutz [Asylum, Protection of Refugees and subsidiary
Protection], http://www.zuwanderung.de/german/l-fluechtlinge.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2009) (follow "Asyl, Fltichtlingsschutz und subsidiirer Schutz" hyperlink).
7. Asylverfahrensgesetz [Asylum Procedure Act], July 27, 1993 BGBI. I at 1396,
§§ 56, 63--64 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Asylum Procedure Act].
8. Article 38 authorizes signatory States to appeal interpretative disputes to the Inter-
national Court of Justice, although it has never been invoked. Refugee Convention, supra note
1, art. 38.
9. See, e.g., REINHARD MARX, KOMMENTAR ZUM ASYLVERFAHRENSGESETZ 1128-30
(2008).
10. Omwenyeke v. Germany, App. No. 44294/04 (2007), http://www.echr.coe.int/
ECHR (follow "Case-law" hyperlink; then follow "HUDOC" hyperlink; then search "Deci-




twenty-first century, pursuant to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam," did not
change the German legal landscape in this regard, because the 2003 Re-
ception Directive establishes the minimum level of free movement that
E.U. States must allow asylum seekers and contains sufficient carve-out
language to permit the Residenzpflicht.'2
This Note explores whether the E.C. treaties, nonetheless, provide
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) sufficient competence to use the
Reception Directive as a vehicle to assess the Residenzpflicht in relation
to the Refugee Convention. It concludes that, through the Resi-
denzpflicht, Germany denies refugees lawfully present their Convention
right to free movement within its territory, and that the ECJ can order the
restoration of this right. Part II argues that refugees who have formally
applied for asylum but whose status has not yet been determined are
lawfully present. Therefore, although the Residenzpflicht is apparently
within the minimum standards described by Reception Directive Articles
7 and 16,"3 its enforcement places Germany in violation of Article 26 of
the Refugee Convention. 14 Part III argues that Convention Article 31 fur-
ther constrains the application of the Residenzpflicht by describing the
tests that must be met in order to allow a State to impose movement re-
strictions and by indicating how even refugees who entered the host
State irregularly can "regularize" their presence and gain the right to un-
restricted movement. Part IV then considers using the European Union's
judicial process to protect the rights that the Residenzpflicht infringes.
Finally, this Note observes that the European Commission has proposed
amendments to the Reception Directive," presenting an opportunity to
11. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Estab-
lishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340)
1 [hereinafter Amsterdam Treaty].
12. Council Directive 2003/9, art. 7(1), 2003 O.J. (L 31) 18 (EC) [hereinafter Reception
Directive].
13. Article 16 permits Member States to "reduce or withdraw reception conditions"
from asylum seekers in response to, inter alia, violations of restrictions imposed pursuant to
Article 7. Id. art. 16(l)(a). Beyond the obvious concern regarding the lawfulness of those
restrictions, the Refugee Convention does not permit denial or withdrawal of refugee rights for
administrative transgressions. See, e.g., HATHAWAY, supra note 5, at 702 n.223.
14. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 26.
15. Under Article 25 of the Reception Directive, the Commission should have reported
on the application of the Directive by August 6, 2006, but did not issue the report until No-
vember 11, 2007. See Comm'n of the Eur. Communities, Report from the Commission to the
Council and to the European Parliament on the Application of Directive 2003/9/EC of 27
January 2003 Laying Down Minimum Standards for the Reception of Asylum Seekers, at 2,
COM (2007) 745 final (Nov. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Application Report]. The Commission
released a proposal for amendments to the Directive pursuant to that report in December 2008.
See Press Release, Europa, Questions and Answers on the Commission Proposal to Amend the
Reception Conditions Directive (Dec. 3, 2008),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/0876&format=HTML&a
ged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [hereinafter Questions and Answers Press Release].
Winter 2009)
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obviate the need for the ECJ to clarify that the Reception Directive can-
not be interpreted to allow the Residenzpflicht to breach the limits that
the Convention places on States' power to restrict the movement of refu-
gees lawfully in their territory.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. The 1951 Refugee Convention
The Refugee Convention defines "refugee,' ' 16 and enumerates the
rights that accompany that status. 7 In the Convention's terms, refugee
status does not depend on state action such as granting asylum or making
a judicial declaration-a person either is or is not a refugee. As the con-
nections between refugee and host State deepen over time-identity
papers are issued or recognized, residence is recorded, education and
employment commence-the Convention recognizes a sliding scale of
refugee rights. These rights exist independently of an asylum process,
or any other official act.
For example, States must grant the foundational right of non-
refoulement-protection from return when facing a risk of persecution-
to all refugees under their jurisdiction.' 9 By contrast, not all refugees, but
only those "lawfully in" a State's territory, are entitled to undertake cer-
tain types of self-employment, 2 whereas refugees "lawfully staying"
may claim access to employment in general.2' Whether a refugee is law-
fully staying, merely lawfully present, or not lawfully present at all, does
not depend upon a state determination of refugee status, but, rather, on
the actual circumstances of the refugee's presence. The rights to free
16. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. l(A)(2) (defining a refugee as any per-
son outside his or her home country "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion").
17. Id. arts. 3-34.
18. HATHAWAY, supra note 5, at 145-55.
19. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(1) (forbidding States from returning a
refugee "in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened"). Exceptions exist for those refugees who either can reasonably be re-
garded as a risk to the security of the host State or who constitute a danger to the community,
as shown by "having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime." Id.
art. 33(2).
20. Id. art. 18.
21. Id. art. 17(1).
22. Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
244 (3d ed. 2007). The meaning of "lawfully in" (especially compared to "lawfully staying")
is not entirely settled, but "the stage between irregular presence and the recognition or denial
of refugee status, including the time required for exhaustion of any appeals or reviews, is also
a form of lawful presence." HATHAWAY, supra note 5, at 175 (internal quotations omitted).
[Vol. 30:515
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movement and residence within the host State's territory discussed in
this Note do not belong to all refugees within a State's jurisdiction, but
only to refugees "lawfully in" that State. Interpreting and applying this
term is therefore crucial to assessing the Residenzpflicht against the
Convention. If refugees may be considered "lawfully present" before the
German government determines their status, then the Convention forbids
the residence and movement restrictions placed on asylum seekers as a
class by the Residenzpflicht.
B. The Residenzpflicht
Upon filing an application for asylum in Germany, the applicant re-
ceives a certificate (Aufenthaltsgestattung) confirming identification and
temporary residence permission.23 The applicant must carry this certificate
at all times for the duration of the asylum procedure.24 Asylum seekers
may not choose their region of residence 2' and "may not leave the district
[of the] Ausldnderbehdrde (immigration authorities office) at which they
are registered. '26 These districts can be as small as fifteen square kilome-
ters, with the Asylum Procedure Act (Asylverfahrensgesetz) authorizing
fines and ultimately up to a year's imprisonment for violations. The local
issuing authority has the discretion to change the restrictions on residence
and movement specified in a particular applicant's certificate. 28
Asylum applicants who lack independent means must live in as-
signed housing.29 Housing conditions can be less than ideal. For some
claimants, this has meant living with no personal space, in a single,
undivided room for living, cooking, and sleeping.30 Applicants are often
"Lawfully staying" is a narrower classification, "characterized by officially sanctioned, ongo-
ing presence in a state party," although it still need not necessarily imply formal recognition of
refugee status. Id. at 189; see also GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra, at 524-26 (noting that
lawful presence "implies admission in accordance with the applicable immigration law, for a
temporary purpose," whereas, for example, a grant of indefinite residence status or recognition
of refugee status "will raise a strong presumption that the refugee should be considered as
lawfully staying").
23. Asylum Procedure Act, supra note 7, § 63(1). If the applicant is required to reside
in a reception center, the certificate is valid for three months; otherwise, it is valid for six
months. Id. § 63(2).
24. Id. § 64(1).
25. Id. § 55(1).
26. Anke Schwarzer, What is Residenzpflicht?, D-A-S-H, June 8, 2005, http://eu.d-a-s-
h.org/node/291 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
27. Id.
28. Asylum Procedure Act, supra note 7, § 63(3).
29. Schwarzer, supra note 26.
30. See GERD PAUL & MAREN SEBASTIAN, EVALUIERUNG DER UMSETZUNG DES
NATIONALEN DURCHFOHRUNGSPROGRAMMS 2002 DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCH-
LAND IM RAHMEN DES EUROPAISCHEN FLUiCHTLINGSFONDS (EFF) [EVALUATION OF
GERMANY'S APPLICATION OF THE 2002 NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM WITHIN
Winter 20091
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housed collectively in barracks, unused maintenance buildings, or hospi-
tals, with up to three or four per room.3' Sanitation may be
unsatisfactory, and common areas may not exist. 2 Refugees may also
find themselves in unattractive locations in terms of infrastructure, for
example, in urban industrial areas or lightly settled regions lacking
transportation connections.33
Permits are granted to travel within Germany, but only for fifteen
days per year, and obtaining a permit requires both time and the payment
of fees.34 These restrictions are routinely enforced: "The Sondergesetze
fir Fliichtlinge (special laws regarding refugees) give the police suffi-
cient grounds for picking out foreign-looking people in train stations or
highway rest areas and demanding their ID. Police raids in housing for
asylum seekers are also a matter of routine., 35 Case-by-case, restrictions
imposed by the Residenzpflicht implicate any number of internationally
recognized human rights, including access to health and educational fa-
cilities, employment, and social support networks.36
C. German Law in the European Order
Germany is a federal State within the European Union, governed by
a written constitution (Grundgesetz or Basic Law). The Basic Law al-
lows Germany to cede sovereign powers to the European Union or to
international organizations,37 and gives international law direct effect and
precedence over domestic law. 38 Germany ratified the Refugee Conven-
tion on December 1, 1953, and acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees on November 5, 1969.39 As an E.U. Member
State, Germany is also party to the European Convention on Human






33. PAUL & SEBASTIAN, supra note 30, at 32, 37.
34. Schwarzer, supra note 26.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES [ECRE], SETTING LIM-
ITS: RESEARCH PAPER ON THE EFFECTS OF LIMITS ON THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF
ASYLUM SEEKERS WITHIN THE BORDERS OF EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES (2002) [here-
inafter SETTING LIMITS].
37. Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Federal Constitution] arts.
23(1), 24.
38. Id. art. 25.
39. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267; see U.N. High Commn'r for Refugees [UNHCR], States Parties to the 1951




Rights (ECHR),40 the Convention Against Torture, the Internationaloveanton ivi andPolticl " 42
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other international human
rights treaties. Like the other E.U. Member States, Germany has also
ceded considerable sovereignty to E.U. institutions. The German Consti-
tutional Court acquiesced in this process only after it became satisfied
that E.U. law incorporated sufficient regard for human rights to allow
cession of sovereignty under the Basic Law. 3
Until E.U. institutions began to assume competence over asylum
law, the reconciliation of the Residenzpflicht with Germany's obligations
under the Refugee Convention lay entirely between the government and
the Constitutional Court. German immigration and asylum law is estab-
lished by federal parliamentary acts, and administrative responsibilities
for refugees are spread across the Ldnder.44 The Constitutional Court
supported the Residenzpflicht, and its accompanying restrictions on refu-
gee rights, through its interpretation of "lawful presence" that considers
asylum seekers to be lawfully within Germany only once they are for-
mally and finally recognized as refugees.4 ' The Constitutional Court
views the Residenzpflicht as a part of a larger bundle of measures en-
acted to deal with an increase in the number of asylum seekers arriving
in Germany in the 1980s, and, therefore, its restrictions on movement do
not violate the human rights enshrined in Article 2 of the Basic Law be-
cause these individual rights must be balanced against a greater social
46
need. As discussed below, this view is inconsistent with the meaning of
"lawful presence" as that term is used in the Refugee Convention.47
40. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
41. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
42. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc.
E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
43. Bundesverfasssungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 1986,
73 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 339 (F.R.G.).
44. See Administration of the Federal States, Bund.de, http://www.bund.de/EN/
Administration/Administration-of-the-Federa-States/Administration-of-the-federal-states node.
html (last visited Feb. 20,2009).
45. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 6, 1989,
88 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 187 (ER.G.).
46. MARX, supra note 9, at 1129. Article 2 of the Basic Law states:
(1) Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar
as he does not violate the fights of others or offend against the constitutional order
or the moral law.
(2) Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the
person shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a
law.
Grundgesetz fuir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Federal Constitution] art. 2.
47. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 26.
Winter 2009]
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Of the international tribunals, only the ECtHR has addressed the
compatibility of the Residenzpflicht with supranational law. 8 Once do-
mestic remedies have been exhausted, the ECtHR has jurisdiction to hear
complaints against state actors for violating the European Convention on
Human Rights. The ECHR provides that "[e]veryone lawfully within the
territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence."4'9 When asked in 2007
to rule that the Residenzpflicht's restrictions on movement violate this
provision, however, the ECtHR declined to do so. The court defined for-
eigners provisionally admitted to a part of a State "pending proceedings
to determine whether or not they are entitled to a residence permit under
the relevant provisions of domestic law" as lawfully present only "as
long as they comply with the conditions to which their admission and
stay are subjected."5° In substance, this decision failed to address the rea-
soning in the Constitutional Court's 1997 decision determining that the
Residenzpflicht is a duly proportional means to achieve the legitimate
government purpose of processing asylum applications efficiently.
5
'
Therefore, although it grounded its reasoning in its own, rather than
German, jurisprudence, the ECtHR arrived at the same interpretation of
lawful presence as the Constitutional Court has adopted.
D. E. U. Competence over Asylum Law
A new route to challenge the Residenzpflicht opened in 2005, when
the E.U. competence extended to the respective rights and duties of asy-
lum seekers and host States.52 In 1999, through the Amsterdam Treaty,53
the European Union's partial competence over immigration and asylum
48. Omwenyeke Admissibility Decision, supra note 10.
49. Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms art. 2(1), Sept. 16, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 46 [hereinafter ECHR Protocol No.
4].
50. Omwenyeke Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, at 6.
51. Id. at 3; see also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
Apr. 10, 1997, 96 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 10 (160)
(F.R.G.) (determining that the threat of imprisonment is a proportionate measure when used to
prevent the uncontrolled movement of asylum seekers within Germany).
52. Reception Directive, supra note 12, art. 26(1) (requiring States to transpose the
Directive by February 6, 2005). At the time of writing, Germany and Greece had not reported
transposition, but, under settled E.U. law, a directive's provisions can be held directly effective
after the transposition deadline. See, e.g., Case 14878, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979
E.C.R. 1629, 24. In other words, people affected thereafter by Member State laws that fail to
reach a directive's minimum standards have a right to a judicial remedy.
53. See Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 11. The E.C. treaties are available in consoli-
dated form, and this Note will refer to articles by their number in the consolidated treaties,
unless otherwise specified. See Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of




law began to move under the "first pillar," i.e., under the control of the
E.U. institutions rather than of the Member States acting together through
the Council of the European Union (Council).-4 At the direction of the sub-
sequent European Council55 summit in Tampere, Finland, the Council
adopted a set of four harmonization measures "to level the asylum playing
field and lay the foundations for a Common European Asylum System.
56
The directives 7 enacted pursuant to Article 63 of the E.C. Treaty set out
minimum standards for reception (Reception Directive),58 administrative
procedures of asylum (Procedures Directive),59 conditions for granting
asylum (Qualification Directive), 6° and standards and procedures for use in
case of a sudden, large influx of asylum applicants that strains the recep-
tion capabilities of the receiving States (Temporary Protection
Directive). 6' The accompanying "Dublin Regulation" determines which
54. Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 11, art. 2(15). The Council of the European Union is
the ministerial working group, which, among other responsibilities, drafts certain E.U. laws.
55. This includes the heads of government or State of the Member States, plus the
President of the European Commission.
56. European Commission, The European Union Policy Towards a Common European
Asylum System, http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/asylum/fsj-asylum-introen.htm (last
visited Mar. 8, 2009). "Harmonization" refers to the process by which, over time, the E.U.
institutions guide Member States toward adopting similar laws in areas over which the Euro-
pean Union has assumed competence. The E.U. legislative process that underpins
harmonization is complex. As discussed below, the legislation at issue in this Note was author-
ized under provisions introduced into the E.C. treaties via the Amsterdam Treaty, then drafted
by the European Commission. The Council amended the Commission's draft in "consultation"
with the European Parliament-i.e., the Parliament could essentially make comments and
nonbinding recommendations-and finally adopted the legislation by unanimous vote (each
Member State's representative on the Council exercising one vote). Amendments to these
particular "Tampere" laws will be proposed by the Commission, then revised and adopted by
the Council acting by "qualified majority voting" in "codecision" with the European Parlia-
ment. A "qualified majority" means more than half of the Member States, representing
roughly sixty-two percent of the E.U. population (since January 2007, this is 255 out of the
345 votes on the Council). E.C. Treaties, supra note 53, arts. 205(2), 205(4); see Europa Glos-
sary, Qualified Majority, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/qualifiedmajorityen.htm (last
visited Mar. 8, 2009). Under codecision, the parliament must eventually agree to the amend-
ments, or they will not take effect. E.C. Treaties, supra note 53, art. 251(1).
57. Member States must "transpose" directives, i.e., enact legislation to bring national
law into compliance with the standards set in the directive, or report that existing national law
already meets those standards. See HEMME BATTJES, EUROPEAN ASYLUM LAW AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 35 (2006). A regulation, by contrast, has direct effect, i.e., becomes immediately
enforceable without further legislation. E.C. Treaties, supra note 53, art. 249. A directive can
also take direct effect in Member States that fail to transpose it within the specified time limit.
BATTJES, supra, at 38.
58. See Reception Directive, supra note 12.
59. Council Directive 2005/85, 2005 O.J. (L 326) 13 (EC) [hereinafter Procedures
Directive].
60. Council Directive 2004/83, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EC) [hereinafter Qualification
Directive].
61. Council Directive 2001/55, 2001 O.J. (L 212) 12 (EC) [hereinafter Temporary Pro-
tection Directive].
Winter 2009]
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Member State should handle a given asylum claim, with the aim of pre-
venting people from claiming asylum in more than one E.U. Member
State.62 These laws form the core of the developing Common European
Asylum System (CEAS).
The continuously evolving relationship between E.U. law and inter-
national law is complex, as is the network of constitutional structures
and international political relationships that determines how E.U. law
applies in the Member States. The ECJ is the final interpretive authority
of the E.C. treaties and is therefore competent to interpret the legal in-
struments of the CEAS. Cases reach the ECJ either via reference actions
from Member State courts 3 or via appeal from the European Union's
Court of First Instance. 6' As the ECtHR adjudicates only matters that
arise out of the ECHR, a non-E.U. treaty, its jurisprudence has no imme-
diate impact on the ECJ's decisions. Nevertheless, the ECJ interprets the
E.C. treaties as particularly European instruments, reading them against
the overall background of European, Member State, and international
law, rather than applying standard rules of international treaty interpreta-
tion.6' The same principles of interpretation apply to legislation enacted
pursuant to the E.C. treaties66
62. Council Regulation 2003/343, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1 (EC).
63. In reference actions, Member State courts that are uncertain of how to interpret
E.U. law refer questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which then instructs the
Member State court as to the correct interpretation. E.C. Treaties, supra note 53, art. 234.
Different variations on this basic procedure apply in different realms of E.U. law. See e.g.,
STEVE PEERS, EU JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS LAW 44-45 (2d ed. 2006). Because Articles
234 and 68 of the E.C. Treaty govern refugee and asylum legislation, only the highest Member
State courts, at their sole discretion, may refer questions regarding E.U. asylum measures to
the ECJ. Id. at 37 (noting that, under Article 68, the power usually granted to national courts
by Article 234 to refer questions of E.U. law to the ECJ "only applies to courts from which no
judicial remedy is possible"); see also infra text accompanying notes 85-87.
64. Because Member State actors have a margin of appreciation in interpreting and
applying E.U. asylum instruments, the route to challenge their application is in Member State
courts rather than in the E.U. Court of First Instance. See BATTJES, supra note 57, at 532-34.
65. Id. at 90.
66. The appropriateness of this approach to interpreting the E.C. treaties, and measures
enacted pursuant to them, are not universally accepted. See id. at 61-62. Arguably, the E.C.
treaties not only describe the constitutional structure of the European Union, but are also fun-
damentally international agreements, and, therefore, subject to the interpretive rules of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Id. at 101-02; see also Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, art. 31(2), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties]. The application of minimum standards directives, such as the Recep-
tion Directive, rather than directly binding regulations, reinforces this by ensuring that
Member States retain a certain sovereignty in their right to adopt "more favorable provisions."
Reception Directive, supra note 12, art. 4. This Note will take no view on this interesting
topic, but will simply address the ECJ's interpretive approach.
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In human rights matters, the ECJ takes particular note of the
ECHR,67 but also of other international agreements and practices to
which all Member States adhere, when considering the content of this
common background of E.U. human rights law. In all areas of E.U. law,
legislation must follow the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
Subsidiarity requires that, even within the competences assigned to it by
treaty, the European Union legislates only on matters that, by their na-
ture, need to be handled at a supranational level, leaving the remainder to
the Member States or regional bodies.6 Under proportionality, legisla-
tion must encroach no further into Member State law than is necessary to
accomplish its objectives as directed by the E.C. treaties.69
E. The Reception Directive
The Reception Directive, the first of the Tampere directives to take
effect, lays out minimum standards for the reception conditions that
Member States must provide for asylum seekers. Although the Directive
purports to be "based on a full and inclusive application" of the Refugee
Convention," its provisions appear to permit both movement and resi-
dence restrictions, as applied by the Residenzpflicht,7' and sanctions,
including the withdrawal of reception conditions for violating such re-
strictions.72 The Reception Directive, which applies to all Member States
except Denmark and Ireland,7' references the Refugee Convention for its
definition of "refugee,' 74 and interprets a request for protection under the
Convention as a request for asylum triggering the requirements of the
Reception Directive." In substance, this Directive describes minimum
standards of support that must be provided to asylum seekers in the form
of health care, education, and family rights, for example, as well as
specifying certain administrative procedures.76 Although the Commission
67. See PEERS, supra note 63, at 311 ("[T]he most important source of human rights
rules which the EU courts take into account as regards the general principles of Community
law is [the ECHR].").
68. E.C. Treaties, supra note 53, art. 5.
69. Id. ("Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty.").
70. Reception Directive, supra note 12, pmbl. para. 2.
71. Id. art. 7.
72. Id. art. 16(l)(a).
73. Id. pmbl. para. 20. Ireland and Denmark chose not to opt in to the Reception Direc-
tive according to the respective protocols annexed to the E.C. Treaty. Id. pmbl. paras. 20-21;
see E.C. Treaties, supra note 53, art. 69.
74. Reception Directive, supra note 12, art. 2(e).
75. Id. art. 2(b).
76. ECRE, INFORMATION NOTE ON THE COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003/9/EC OF 27 JANU-
ARY 2003 LAYING DOWN MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE RECEPTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 4-
6, 8 (2003).
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initiated infringement proceedings before the ECJ against Germany for
failure to report transposition," it has not indicated that it considers
German law incompatible with the Directive in substance. 8 Nor would
that seem likely: Article 7 of the Reception Directive (governing asylum
seekers' rights to choice of residence and free movement), closely re-
sembles the Residenzpflicht in detail, as well as in its overall thrust.79
Respect for fundamental human rights forms an integral part of the
background of E.U. law,80 and the Reception Directive refers to the
Refugee Convention in its recitals.8' Direct references to international
law in the E.C. Treaty, and in legislation enacted pursuant to it, require
the ECJ to interpret the Directive's minimum standards in light of the
Convention.8 If shown that the Residenzpflicht leads to ongoingRefugee o i . shonta  iezfl last 
violation of the Convention, the ECJ would have to conclude that either
the Residenzpflicht infringes the Reception Directive, or that the Direc-
tive itself is flawed. Article 234 of the E.C. Treaty allows Member State
courts to stay proceedings pending a request to the ECJ for a preliminary
ruling of law concerning interpretation of the E.C. treaties or an action of
an E.C.- or Council-created institution.83 The E.C. Treaty, however, spe-
cifically restricts this jurisdiction in the realm of asylum law: Article 68,
added by the Amsterdam Treaty, restricts the ability to request prelimi-
nary rulings interpreting Title IV (pertaining to the free movement of
people) to a court "against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy
under national law," which "shall [make such a request], if it considers
that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judg-
ment."' Intriguingly, the 2007 draft Reform Treaty would repeal Article
68, applying full Article 234 jurisdiction to Title IV, and presumably
considerably increasing the number of asylum-related questions referred
77. Application Report, supra note 15, at 2.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Compare Reception Directive, supra note 12, art. 7(2) (allowing assignment of
residence to facilitate application processing), with Asylum Procedure Act, supra note 7, § 56
(tying applicant's assigned residence to the locality of the office that is processing the applica-
tion); compare also Reception Directive, supra note 12, art. 7(5) ("The applicant shall not
require permission to keep appointments with authorities and courts if his or her appearance is
necessary."), with Asylum Procedure Act, supra note 7, § 58(3) ("The alien shall not require
permission to keep appointments with authorities and courts requiring him to appear in per-
son.").
80. E.C. Treaties, supra note 53, arts. 6(1), 6(2).
81. Reception Directive, supra note 12, pmbl. para. 2.
82. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 66, art. 31(2).
83. A Member State court "may, if it considers that a decision on the question is neces-
sary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon," but "a
court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
national law... shall" do so. E.C. Treaties, supra note 53, art. 234 (emphasis added).
84. Id. art. 68(1) (emphasis added).
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to the ECJ.85 Any German court could then ask the ECJ whether the
Residenzpflicht could continue to exist in the E.U. legal order in light of
the Reception Directive as interpreted against background principles of
E.U. law. For the moment, however, ultimate discretion over whether to
refer a question about the Reception Directive to the ECJ rests with the
highest courts of the Member States.
II. RESIDENZPFLICHT, THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE, AND REFUGEES
"LAWFULLY IN" GERMANY
Asylum applications in Germany peaked at about 438,000 in 1992,
and have since declined sharply. 6 Germany received approximately
19,200 applications in 2007, a thirty-year low following more than a
decade of almost continuous decline." Of asylum decisions rendered in
Germany in 2007, approximately 5,409 out of 23,747 (22.8 percent) re-
sulted in international protection based on refugee status.88 Because
German law grants asylum on grounds closely similar to the Refugee
Convention's definition of a refugee,89 it is reasonable to estimate the
number of refugees within the 2007 asylum-seeking population at
around 5,000, albeit with a wide margin of error. Because refugee status
85. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, art. 67, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter
Reform Treaty].
86. See EUROSTAT, ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 3 (2007), avail-
able at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITYOFFPUB/KS-SF-07-1 10/EN/KS-SF-07-
1 10-EN.pdf [hereinafter ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION].
87. UNHCR, ASYLUM LEVELS AND TRENDS IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, 2007, at 7
(Mar. 18, 2008) [hereinafter UNHCR, ASYLUM LEVELS AND TRENDS].
88. U.S. Dep't of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Germany 2007
(Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100561 .htm. The report
does not distinguish between those granted asylum based on Convention refugee status, versus
those granted subsidiary protection under the Qualification Directive, but Germany approves
far more asylum applications on the basis of refugee status than under such subsidiary protec-
tion. UNHCR, ASYLUM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE 13 (2007) [hereinafter UNHCR, QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE
STUDY].
89. See Helene Lambert et al., Comparative Perspectives of Constitutional Asylum in
France, Italy and Germany: Requiescat in Pace?, ASYLUM REFUGEE SURV. Q., 2008, at 17,
26-32 (noting that, over the past fifty years, approximately, German asylum law has con-
verged toward the Refugee Convention, and, in modem Germany, "[c]onstitutional asylum has
lost any practical relevance" as international and E.U. asylum law have superseded Germany's
older constitutional guarantee). This assessment hints at the underlying difficulty that the
Constitutional Court may be having in squaring German law with international standards. It is
no longer sufficient to evaluate laws that interfere with human rights purely against the pro-
portionality requirement contained in the German Basic Law, but at least as recently as the
European Court of Human Rights' (ECtHR) Omwenyeke, that still appears to be the Constitu-
tional Court's primary yardstick. See Omwenyeke Admissibility Decision, supra note 10.
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precedes its declaration, the only way to ensure the rights owed to refu-
gees before they are formally granted asylum is to treat the entire
asylum-seeking population as presumptive refugees, and to extend to
them the Refugee Convention rights owed to refugees in an equivalent
situation.
This Part argues that the Refugee Convention entitles refugees
within the asylum-seeking population to free movement and choice of
residence within Germany, subject only to regulations applicable to simi-
larly situated aliens. It follows that even though the Asylum Procedure
Act and the Ausldndergesetz (Foreigners Act) 90 appear permissible on a
plain reading of Article 7 of the Reception Directive regarding freedom
of movement, their enforcement violates the rights of these refugees un-
der the Convention.9' Part II.A reviews the relationships between
Refugee Convention Article 26, the Reception Directive, and the Asylum
Procedure Act, arguing that if refugees holding the Aufenthaltsgestattung
(restricted residence permit) are lawfully present in Germany, then en-
forcement of the Residenzpflicht violates their general right to free
movement and residence under Convention Article 26.92 Part II.B argues
that, under the Convention, these refugees are indeed lawfully present.
This Part then concludes that, on a plain reading, Article 7 of the Recep-
tion Directive sanctions practices that conflict with Refugee Convention
Articles 26 and 31.93
A. The Reception Directive and Free Movement Under
Article 26 of the Refugee Convention
Under Article 7(2) of the Reception Directive, "Member States may
decide on the residence of the asylum seeker for reasons of public inter-
est, public order or, when necessary, for the swift processing and
effective monitoring of his or her application."94 Article 7(1) provides a
general power for States to restrict freedom of movement ("Asylum
seekers may move freely within the territory of the host Member State or
within an area assigned to them by that Member State"95), and Article
90. Auslandergesetz [Foreigners Act], July 9, 1990 BGBI. I at 1354 (ER.G.).
91. Reception Directive, supra note 12, art. 7.
92. Article 26 of the Refugee Convention states:
Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to
choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory, subject to any
regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.
Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 26.
93. Compare Reception Directive, supra note 12, art. 7, with Refugee Convention,
supra note 1, arts. 26, 31.
94. Reception Directive, supra note 12, art. 7(2).
95. Id. art. 7(l).
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7(3) purports to allows States to "confine an applicant to a particular
place" when necessary, "for example for legal reasons or reasons of pub-
lic order."96 These restrictions are designed to have teeth, as "Member
States may," via national legislation, "make provision of the material
reception conditions subject to actual residence by the applicants in a
specific place, 97 and Reception Directive Article 16(1)(a) further seeks
to permit Member States to "reduce or withdraw reception conditions"
generally if, for example, an asylum seeker fails to comply with unspeci-
fied "reporting duties."98
Each of these provisions of Article 7 encompasses practices, imple-
mented by Germany's Administrative Procedure Act, that fall short of
the requirements of Refugee Convention Article 26. The Asylum Proce-
dure Act provides that asylum seekers permitted to reside in Germany
pending asylum proceedings "shall not be entitled to choose a specific
Land or a specific place" to reside.99 Yet, under Article 26, lawfully pre-
sent refugees among the asylum-seeking population possess the same
right to choose their residence as other similarly situated aliens in
Germany.'t° Once they hold the Aufenthaltsgestattung, asylum seekers
have leave to remain until their status is resolved. The same document
attests to their identity. Whether the leave is granted for a specified pe-
riod or indefinitely, no other category of aliens granted leave to remain in
Germany and holding valid identity papers is required to reside
where directed by the authorities. Likewise, the Asylum Procedure Act
uses the opportunity presented by Reception Directive Article 7(1) to
confine asylum seekers to their local Landkreis, even though no other
similarly situated group of aliens must remain within a sub-Land region
during their stay in Germany.' °' The same Act implements Reception
Directive Article 7(3) by granting each aliens' office essentially complete
96. Id. art. 7(3). Read in accordance with Article 26 of the Refugee Convention, "law-
fully present applicants may not be subjected to this confinement." BATTJES, supra note 57, at
498.
97. Reception Directive, supra note 12, art. 7(4).
98. Id. art. 16(l)(a).
99. Asylum Procedure Act, supra note 7, § 55(1).
100. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 26. The Convention generally defines "in
the same circumstances" to mean that a refugee must meet the same administrative require-
ments for the enjoyment of a particular right as would be necessary if the person were not a
refugee. Id. art. 6; see, e.g., HATHAWAY, supra note 5, at 205-08 (arguing that Article 6 aims
to ensure that refugees receive treatment at least as favorable as that extended to other aliens
entitled to the same right in question).
101. Asylum Procedure Act, supra note 7, § 56. People holding the Duldung, a tolerated
status granted for humanitarian and other purposes that carries protection against deportation,
must remain within a particular Land but are not generally further restricted to a Landkreis.
Aufenthaltsgesetz [Residence Act], July 30, 2004, BGBI. I at 1950, § 61(1) (F.R.G.).
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discretion to further circumscribe movement on an individual basis.' °
Enforcement of these provisions, even though they comport with Recep-
tion Directive Article 7, would violate the Refugee Convention if applied
to lawfully present refugees.
If refugees in the asylum determination process are lawfully present,
then the minimum standards that the Reception Directive provides for
Member State legislation fall short of the requirements of the Refugee
Convention. A reading of Article 7(1) that would permit the Resi-
denzpflicht would appear to open a gap between the Reception Directive
and Article 26 of the Refugee Convention. Directive Article 7
addresses "asylum seekers" in general, and hence includes both
lawfully and unlawfully present refugees. It follows from Article
26 [of the Refugee Convention] ... that Member States may re-
strict the freedom of movement of "lawfully present" applicants
to "an area assigned to them," or decide on their place of resi-
dence only if their regulations generally do so.O3
Since the Residenzpflicht regulates only asylum seekers, and no other
category of non-national in Germany is subjected to such stringent
movement restrictions, it is not a generally applicable regulation. The
Aufenthaltsgestattung entitles its holder .to remain in Germany for as
long as six months, or longer if needed to resolve the asylum claim. 1"
This is a more durable right to remain than is extended to the general
population of aliens admitted to the territory, a population whose move-
ments once within the territory is not generally restricted, or even
monitored. To interpret "aliens generally in the same circumstances"
narrowly enough to permit the Residenzpflicht would create a class con-
sisting essentially of people in the asylum determination process who are
not refugees. This would rob the word "generally" of all meaning, which
cannot have been the Convention drafters' intent.
Unsurprisingly, courts that have upheld these provisions of the Resi-
denzpflicht against challenges based on rights of free movement for
people lawfully present have done so not by justifying such provisions in
light of Article 26 and similar sources of law, but through holding that
the people concerned were not "lawfully" present at all.' °5 The Constitu-
102. Asylum Procedure Act, supra note 7, § 20(2).
103. BATTJES, supra note 57, at 499 (emphasis added). This argument assumes that refu-
gees who have been formally admitted into the asylum process are by definition lawfully
present in the host State. The next sub-section of this Note discusses that assumption, conclud-
ing that it is correct.
104. Asylum Procedure Act, supra note 7, § 63.
105. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June
6, 1989, 88 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 148 (F.R.G.) (holding
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tional Court consistently holds to the view that neither Article 26 nor
Article 31(2) rights attach until the State recognizes refugee status, and
that the Residenzpflicht is "necessary" within the meaning of Article
31(2).' 6 The European Court of Human Rights buttresses this, in effect,
by deferring to national authorities the definition of whether presence is
lawful. 10 7 As discussed below, however, interpreting the Refugee Conven-
tion according to the rules of international treaty law leaves little doubt
that refugees generally attain lawful presence not upon conclusion of the
asylum determination process, but very nearly at its start.
B. Refugees in the German Status Determination
Process Are Lawfully Present
In 2007, the European Court of Human Rights denied, as manifestly
unfounded, Sunday Omwenyeke's claim against Germany for damages
based on the sanctions imposed for violating the Residenzpflicht when he
left his assigned area without permission. '°0 The ECtHR's reasoning-
that obedience to residence restrictions imposed by national law is a
necessary precondition to lawful presence under the ECHR°9-1eaves
little reason to believe that the same court would hear the merits of any
case challenging the Residenzpflicht's basic rules. The ECJ, despite its
limited scope for intervention, remains the only other supranational tri-
bunal likely to hear an individual challenge to the Residenzpflicht."o
Although the ECJ could treat the interference of the Residenzpflicht
with Refugee Convention rights as an issue entirely of first impression, it
might also look to the ECtHR for guidance. In theory, the jurisdictional
lines are clear enough-the ECtHR applies the ECHR, the ECJ inter-
prets E.U. measures-but the ECHR, like the Refugee Convention,
forms part of the backdrop of shared European legal standards against
which E.U. laws must be interpreted. While the ECtHR carefully inter-
preted "lawfully within" a State specifically with reference to the ECHR,
Omwenyeke nonetheless made prominent reference to the Refugee
that Refugee Convention Article 26 rights attach only following a final determination of refu-
gee status).
106. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 10, 1997,
96 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 10 (Q 58) (F.R.G.).
107. Omwenyeke Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, at 6 (ruling that "[i]t is for the
domestic law and organs to lay down the conditions which must be fulfilled for a person's
presence in the territory to be considered 'lawful').
108. Id. at 7.
109. Id. at 6-7.
110. In a nonbinding opinion, the U.N. Human Rights Committee ruled that freedom of
movement restrictions cannot be applied as a blanket measure, but require case-by-case analy-
sis. See UNHCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of
the Covenant: Concluding Observations of Human Rights Committee: Lithuania, 15, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 87 (Nov. 19, 1997).
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Convention as a source of law."' Thus, it might appear persuasive to an-
other court interpreting "lawfully in," as used in the Refugee
Convention, when addressing lawful presence as a threshold to consider-
ing the interaction of the Residenzpflicht with the right to free
movement. The ECJ is certainly not bound to follow ECtHR jurispru-
dence even when analyzing the interaction of the ECHR with E.U. law,
let alone to guide its interpretation of the Reception Directive in light of
the Refugee Convention, but might nevertheless review the ECtHR's
understandiug of the right to free movement for persons lawfully pre-
sent, if asked to interpret the similar right in the context of the Reception
Directive.
To use Omwenyeke in this way would be erroneous. Mr. Omwenyeke
raised his rights under Article 26 of the Refugee Convention, ' 2 but after
reciting the text of Article 26, the ECtHR upheld the German court's in-
terpretation of lawful presence entirely without reference to the
Convention."3 In declaring the application manifestly unfounded, the
Court instead followed a line of precedent seeming to support the propo-
sition that national law determines whether a person is "lawfully within"
a State for the purposes of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR.'"
4
Even if that precedent were particularly convincing, it misses the point
that as a presumptive refugee,' '5 Mr. Omwenyeke fell into a subcategory
of the "everyone" referred to in the ECHR, a subcategory owning spe-
cific legal rights that predate Protocol No. 4. The lawfulness of his
presence, at least for the purposes of freedom of movement, flowed not
from national law, but from the treaty commitment that Germany made
111. Omwenyeke Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, at 5.
112. Id. at 3-4.
113. Id. at 5-8.
114. Id. at 6. Article 2 of ECHR Protocol No. 4 states:
(1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
(2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
(3) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as
are in accordance with law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security or public safety, for the maintenance of ordre public, for the
prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.
ECHR Protocol No. 4, supra note 49, art. 2.
115. Before his refugee status had been determined, Mr. Omwenyeke obtained perma-
nent residence through marriage. Omwenyeke Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, at 2.
Because he was never shown not to be a refugee, the presumption that he was a refugee during
his time as an asylum seeker in Germany must continue to hold.
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to refugees in 1953 when it ratified the Refugee Convention." 6 Interna-
tional law outweighs national legislation under the German Basic Law."
17
The ECHR's affirmation of a narrower right of free movement within the
broader, general category of people "lawfully within" Germany can af-
fect neither the content of the right to free movement recognized by
Articles 26 and 31 of the earlier Convention, nor the contours of the
class of people owning that right. Lawfulness of a refugee's presence is
established, or not, with respect to the Convention, even if the lawfulness
of a non-refugee's presence under the ECHR depends entirely on na-
tional law and authorities. As no supranational authority has yet ruled on
the meaning of "lawful presence" as used in the Convention, the term
must be interpreted de novo, with regard to the context, object, and pur-
pose of the Convention.
Generally, during the time when a refugee has entered the asylum
system but status has not yet been recognized or denied, that refugee
would be considered "lawfully present" for purposes of the Refugee
Convention." 8 The drafting history supports this reading," 9 as does intui-
tion: refugees holding formal residence permission pursuant to Section
55(1) of the Asylum Procedure Act are lawfully present in Germany be-
cause "it cannot sensibly be argued that persons who avail themselves of
domestic laws which authorize entry into a refugee status determination
or comparable procedure are not lawfully present.' ' 2°
Yet, if lawful presence is established, it is difficult to see what Con-
vention ground could support Germany's restrictions on residence and
movement during the asylum process. It is problematic, and restrictive,
to read the Convention as allowing "particularized detention measures
[to] continue until and unless the irregular entrant is accepted 'for per-
manent resettlement. ' " 2 ' Following that logic could lead to the
conclusion that the Aufenthaltsgestattung merely reflects an intermediate
status for claimants whose presence is not yet-and, if their claims fail,
will never be-lawful.
This view does not stand up to common sense in the context of
Germany's legal regime. First, if claimants are in Germany unlawfully, it
seems odd for the German government to issue them residence docu-
ments at all. Second, the Refugee Convention provides for States to
116. Although the ECHR predates the 1951 Refugee Convention, the right to free
movement and choice of residence only entered the ECHR via Protocol No. 4 in 1963. See
ECHR Protocol No. 4, supra note 49.
117. Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (GG) [Basic Law] art. 25.
118. See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 22, at 524.
119. See HATHAWAY, supra note 5, at 175.
120. Id. at 179.
121. Id. at 415.
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restrict freedom of movement only on an individual basis, under excep-
tional circumstances, 2 and, "[a]part from the few days for investigation,
it may be argued that the drafters of the 1951 Convention intended that
further detention would need to be justified as necessary under Article
31(2), or exceptional under Article 9.,,123 This starkly contrasts with the
three-or-six-month residence permission granted by Section 63(2) of the
Asylum Procedure Act, 24 as well as the widely reported fact that claim-
ants routinely remain in this intermediate state for years on end.'
2
-
Finally, Germany has a well-established accelerated claim evaluation
procedure that it applies at certain airports, detaining applicants until the
authorities render an asylum decision.2 6 If that accelerated process takes
longer than two days (or two weeks in the case of an appeal), the claim-
ant is "allowed to enter the country and the regular procedure."'
27
In short, the German asylum regime is either legally inconsistent, or
it (1) supplies formal identification and residence permission to persons
unlawfully present in Germany, (2) knowingly allows unlawful presence
for years on end, and (3) has an accelerated asylum procedure that rou-
tinely releases asylum seekers into its general population while formally
considering their presence in the country unlawful. Germany evidently
does not intend to recognize lawful presence via the Aufenthaltsgestat-
tung, but, in any meaningful sense, it does exactly that.
III. FREE MOVEMENT RIGHTS FOR IRREGULARLY
ARRIVING REFUGEES
Even if the restrictions imposed by the Residenzpflicht do not violate
the general right to free movement in Article 26 of the Refugee
Convention, Article 31 of that Convention significantly limits the
circumstances in which states may restrict movement. 12  Read in
122. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 9 (stating that, in time of war or other excep-
tional circumstances, States may apply provisional measures that it considers essential to
national security to "a particular person, pending a determination... that that person is in fact
a refugee and that the continuance of such measures is necessary in his case").
123. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 22, at 463.
124. Asylum Procedure Act, supra note 7, § 63(2).
125. SETTING LIMITS, supra note 36, at 18.
126. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees: Non-Penalization, Detention, and Protection, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 211
(Erika Feller, Volker Tuirk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003). The German Constitutional Court
ruled in 1996 "that holding asylum seekers in closed facilities in [airport] transit zone[s]" did
not "amount[] to either detention or a limitation of freedom, as the individuals were free at any
time to leave, for example, to return to their country of origin." Id.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Article 31 of the Refugee Convention states:
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conjunction with Article 26, Article 31(2) clarifies that "regularization"
of a refugee's presence in the host State suffices to entitle that refugee to
unrestricted movement within the territory of the host State. 29 Reviewing
Reception Directive Article 7 in light of Convention Article 31 reveals
gaps between the minimum standards described in Article 7 and the
higher minimum requirements of the Convention. Because Article 31
protects a limited right to free movement within the host State for
refugees who enter that State irregularly, and instructs how to remove
those limitations, fulfillment of the conditions for removing those
limitations implies lawful presence, which requires recognition of the
full right to free movement and residence as described in Article 26.
A. Convention Article 31 's Protections of Free Movement
Even if refugees whose final status has not yet been determined were
not "lawfully" in Germany, and thus not yet entitled to the right to free
movement described in Article 26, the Residenzpflicht would still in-
fringe their rights under Article 31 of the Refugee Convention. Article 31
indicates how unlawfully present refugees can regularize their pres-
ence. 3 ° By recognizing that even refugees who arrived irregularly in the
host State enjoy a qualified right to free movement, Article 31 also im-
plies that after regularization, the refugee's presence is lawful and the
unqualified rights of Article 26 attach. 3' If a refugee who entered
irregularly, triggering Article 31, possesses the right to free movement
following regularization, the Convention cannot intend to deny those
(1) The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal en-
try or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life
or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their ter-
ritory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.
(2) The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees re-
strictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be
applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into
another country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable pe-
riod and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country.
Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 31.
129. Id. art. 31(2).
130. Id. art. 31.
131. GOODWIN-GILL & McADAM, supra note 22, at 522. Goodwin-Gill and McAdam
noted that refugees complying with Article 31(l)'s conditions for curing irregular entry
are not to be subjected to "penalties," which appears to comprehend prosecution,
fine, and imprisonment, but not administrative detention. Article 31(2) makes it
clear that [S]tates may impose "necessary" restrictions on movement .... Such
measures.. . are an exception to the freedom of movement called for by Article 26.
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rights to similarly situated refugees who did not enter the host State ir-
regularly. Refugees who can demonstrate a degree of regularization that
would satisfy Article 31(2) are entitled to the complete set of rights per-
taining to refugees lawfully present.
Nonetheless, a plain reading of Article 7 of the Reception Directive
appears to countenance practices that violate free movement rights under
Convention Article 31. First and obviously, the Directive casts too wide a
net: Refugee Convention Article 31 spells out the limited ways in which
States may restrict the movement of those who enter the host State ir-
regularly, whereas Reception Directive Article 7(1), by omitting
reference to the nature of entry, ensnares refugees who entered regularly
as well. 32 Second, Reception Directive Article 7(3) cannot by itself sup-
port the Residenzpflicht, as its reference to permitting the confinement of
asylum seekers for "legal reasons" can only sensibly refer to generally
applicable criminal sanctions, or to restricting the movement of appli-
cants physically present who entered the host State irregularly, and thus
must also fall within Convention Article 31.' Finally, the Convention
does not permit confinement of any kind for "reasons of public order."' 34
The Convention allows States to invoke public order to justify control-
ling the movement of lawfully present refugees only under two
exceptional circumstances. Under Article 28, States may withhold inter-
national travel documents for "compelling reasons of national security or
public order," and Article 32 allows the expulsion in limited circum-
stances of individual refugees who pose a serious threat to society or
national security.'35 Administrative confinement of refugees who enter a
State in a regular fashion, or who cure their irregular entry according to
Convention Article 31(1), remains impermissible under the Convention.
B. "Regularization" Lifts Even "Necessary"
Restrictions of Movement
Even as applied to asylum seekers who enter Germany irregularly,
the Residenzpflicht violates the Refugee Convention. Article 31(2) pre-
sents two tests for whether a State may restrict the movement of this
subset of refugees within the asylum-seeking population. First, the re-
132. Compare Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 31, with Reception Directive,
supra note 12, art. 7(1) (requiring States to allow all asylum seekers free movement through-
out their territories "or within an area assigned to them by [the State]").
133. BATTJES, supra note 57, at 498.
134. Reception Directive, supra note 12, art. 7(3).
135. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, arts. 28, 32. It is important to note that even
Article 32 expulsion does not affect refugee status. See, e.g., UNHCR, QUALIFICATION DIREC-
TIVE STUDY, supra note 88, at 94. Even a refugee expellable under Article 32, if allowed to
remain in the host State, would retain the Convention rights to free movement afforded to
refugees lawfully present. HATHAWAY, supra note 5, at 182-83.
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strictions must be "necessary," and, second, the restrictions must cease
once the asylum seeker's status has been "regularized."'36 These terms
can only be correctly interpreted in light of the context, object, and pur-
pose of the treaty.
3 1
The fundamental purpose of the Refugee Convention is to protectS 138
certain human rights, whereas the Residenzpflicht was introduced to
balance responsibility across the Ldnder in response to rising numbers of
asylum seekers in the 1970s.139 Yet, with fewer than a quarter of the an-
nual asylum applications now in a united Germany than West Germany
alone processed in 1980,'4° and with the annual number of asylum seek-
ers arriving at less than five percent of West Germany's peak level,'' the
conditions that engendered the Residenzpflicht no longer exist. It is ques-
tionable to read "necessary" in Article 31(2) so broadly as to mean
"necessary" to the efficient distribution of administrative duties, in a
place and time of peace and prosperity facing an ongoing but relatively
small inflow of refugees.
More likely, in light of the history of the first half of the twentieth
century, the drafters of the Refugee Convention envisioned "necessary"
to indicate a sudden, mass flight across a particular (probably intra-
European) border that might require extra time to receive and regular-
ize. 42 Even the influx of asylum seekers following the Yugoslav crises of
the early 1990s did not overwhelm Germany's reception capacity, and
today the Temporary Protection Directive provides for the European Un-
ion and other Member States to support a State unable to cope with such
a situation. 43 Since the entry into force of the Reception Directive, with
136. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 31(2).
137. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 66, art. 31(1).
138. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. The preamble to a treaty is fundamen-
tal to reading it in its context. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 66, art.
31(2).
139. SETTING LIMITS, supra note 36, at 10.
140. Id. at 10 (reporting 92,000 asylum seekers in West Germany).
141. There were 438,000 asylum seekers in 1992, versus 19,200 in 2007. ASYLUM AP-
PLICATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 86, at 3; UNHCR, ASYLUM LEVELS AND
TRENDS, supra note 87, at 7.
142. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 22, at 522 ("Article 31 makes it clear that
states may impose 'necessary' restrictions on movement, which would include those prompted
by security considerations or special circumstances like a large influx.").
143. Temporary Protection Directive, supra note 61, arts. 24-27. The Temporary Protec-
tion Directive also specifies reception obligations, and, by specifically providing for States to
withdraw temporary protection benefits while asylum seekers are in the regular process, indi-
cates that a separate set of rights and obligations govern asylum seekers in normal times. Id.
Therefore, a large influx situation falls outside of the scope of the Reception Directive entirely
and cannot be used to justify movement restrictions under Article 31 of the Refugee Conven-
tion on asylum seekers in the regular process.
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its Residenzpflicht-shaped carve-out around the right to free movement
and residence, no other E.U. State has implemented such a system.'"
Compared to many other E.U. States, Germany faces a small admin-
istrative responsibility for asylum seekers relative to its population or
gross domestic product.' 45 It is difficult to see what particular need Ger-
many faces that is strong enough to overcome the fundamental
humanitarian purpose of the Convention and fit the Residenzpflicht
within this exceptional condition of Article 31(2). Even under the Con-
stitutional Court's interpretation of the German Basic Law, requiring that
individual rights be weighed against the needs of society as a whole
(here, the need to process asylum applications efficiently), the Resi-
denzpflicht is a disproportionate response. Registered asylum seekers can
easily be notified of hearings via their addresses on file with the authori-
ties, and, like other classes of people, sanctioned via administrative fines
for failure to appear. Alternatively, asylum seekers could simply give
notice of planned absences from their assigned districts, allowing them
to be located as needed for the smooth processing of their applications
while drastically reducing the inconvenience to their lives.1
46
In any case, the restrictions envisioned in Article 31 of the Refugee
Convention are short term, until the refugee's status is "regularized.' 47
Regularization does not require a final determination of refugee status,
but simply that the refugees present themselves to the authorities and are
allowed to take the steps necessary to remain legally in the host State.
48
The Duldung, a temporary permit granting leave to remain in Germany
on humanitarian grounds with access to a minimum level of social sup-
port, is granted as an act of administrative discretion, often to people
from particular countries or ethnic groups without requiring assessment
of individual circumstances. 14 Its holders, unlike asylum seekers holding
144. Austria restricts the movement of asylum seekers within the State, see Application
Report, supra note 15, at 7, but only during the admissibility stage of the asylum proceeding, a
period of no more than twenty days, Asylgesetz [AsylG 2005] [Asylum Act 2005] Bundesge-
setzblatt Teil I [BGBI I] No. 100/2005, § 12(2) (Austria).
145. In the first half of 2008, Germany received 10,725 asylum claims, versus 10,164 for
Greece and approximately 1,100 for Malta. UNHCR, ASYLUM LEVELS AND TRENDS, supra
note 87, at 23.
146. For example, if an asylum seeker needs to appear in court or before another public
authority outside of the assigned Landkreis, it is not necessary to obtain prior permission for
the trip. Asylum Procedure Act, supra note 7, § 58(3). Even an asylum seeker who is restricted
to the local area around a reception center need only inform the authorities in advance of the
trip. Id. § 57(3). Extending the same procedure to all travel outside of the Landkreis might
present a smaller administrative burden than maintaining and enforcing the restrictions of the
Residenzpflicht.
147. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 31.
148. See, e.g., Suke Wolton, Regularization, in IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM: FROM 1900
TO THE PRESENT 505, 505-06 (Matthew J. Gibney & Randall Hansen eds., 2005).
149. Aufenthaltsgesetz [Residence Act], July 20, 2004, BGB1. I at 1950, § 60a (ER.G.).
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the Aufenthaltgestattung, are not required to remain within a single
Landkreis.'5 The Aufenthaltsgestattung demonstrates a considerably
closer tie to Germany: its holders have had their identity confirmed, their
fingerprints recorded, their residence registered, and their asylum claims
formally taken under consideration.' This process, leading to a status
that does not usually change for the entire duration of the asylum proc-
ess, can surely be classified as regularization. It is therefore
impermissible under international law to apply the geographic restric-
tions described by the Residenzpflicht to refugees who enter Germany in
a regular manner, to those who enter irregularly and then cure that ir-
regularity per Refugee Convention Article 31(1), or even to those who
enter irregularly but do not cure. In sum, the Residenzpflicht may not be
applied to refugees, every asylum seeker must be presumed to be a refu-
gee until demonstrated otherwise, and, therefore, the application of
Residenzpflicht in its current form is unlawful.
IV. POSSIBLE AVENUES OF LEGAL CHALLENGE
TO THE RESIDENZPFLICHT
The potential for conflict when a directive establishes minimum
standards that fall short of the Refugee Convention can present E.U. and
Member State courts with an uncomfortable choice between sanctioning
violations of the Convention, ruling that adherence to the black-letter
minimum standards of the directive is unlawful, or simply reading the
directive's provisions as null in view of the Convention's stricter re-
quirements. Preparing a case that the Constitutional Court has
erroneously interpreted lawful presence under the Refugee Convention is
relatively straightforward. Presenting a case to the ECJ that the Recep-
tion Directive prohibits the Residenzpflicht, however, is problematic,
largely due to the limitation imposed by Article 68 of the E.C. Treaty on
that court's jurisdiction over asylum law.'52 Nevertheless, the ECJ, if
asked, should interpret the minimum standards established by the Recep-
tion Directive in light of the Convention, invalidating the restrictions on
the movement of asylum seekers imposed by the Residenzpflicht.
A. Remedies Under European Law: Jurisdiction
Procedurally, there are three ways to attack the Asylum Procedure
Act in the ECJ. First, the European Commission could initiate an
150. Id. § 61 (providing that those holding tolerated status are generally restricted to a
Land rather than their local Landkreis).
151. Asylum Procedure Act, supra note 7, §§ 63(2), 63(3).
152. See E.C. Treaties, supra note 53, art. 68; supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
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infringement proceeding against Germany, casting the Reception Direc-
tive as incorporating the minimum requirements of the Convention
where those exceed the minimum requirements spelled out in the Direc-
tive, or arguing that Germany's laws that admittedly fit within the
Directive's provisions nonetheless violate the Directive when interpreted
against the backdrop of European law.53 Second, a Member State or an
E.U. actor could request an advisory opinion on the abstract question of
whether Articles 7 and 16 of the Reception Directive comport with the
Refugee Convention.' Such a request is unlikely,, as it would amount to
an attack on an aspect of E.U. law directly reflective of pre-existing Ger-
man law, coming from the government of a Member State that had
previously assented to the Directive, or that joined the European Union
after its enactment. 5 Finally, an asylum applicant sanctioned for violat-
ing the Residenzpflicht could appeal through the German courts as Mr.
Omwenyeke did, and eventually request-albeit not presently demand
by right-a reference from the highest court of appeal to the ECJ. 5 6 De-
spite the significant obstacle posed by Article 68 of the E.C. Treaty,'57
such a reference action is probably the most realistic method of testing
the Residenzpflicht in the ECJ.
Pending the Reform Treaty, '58 or another agreement to repeal Article
68, the threshold task remains to convince the Constitutional Court to
reconsider its views that lawful presence begins only on formal recogni-
tion of refugee status and that violators of the Residenzpflicht cannot be
considered lawfully present in Germany. The recent evolution of the
common European asylum system has made a new argument available to
such an end. In December 2007, less than two weeks after the ECtHR
decided Omwenyeke, the Asylum Procedures Directive took full effect,5 9
grounding the right for an asylum seeker to remain in a Member State in
153. Case C-540/03, Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. 1-5769, 35-36.
154. Outside of the context of a specific case, Member States or E.U. institutions may
ask for a "ruling on a question of interpretation of. . . acts of the institutions of the Commu-
nity based on [Title IV]." E.C. Treaties, supra note 53, art. 68(3). Article 68 also excepts from
ECJ jurisdiction decisions "relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding
of internal security" in the context of the European Community's generally applicable rules on
the free movement of people. See id. art. 68(3); id. art. 61(2) (eliminating border controls
within the European Union); id. art. 14 (establishing an open internal market within the Euro-
pean Union).
155. It is doubtful that an E.U. institutional actor would follow this route. The Commis-
sion has the infringement mechanism available, the Council would not act over Germany's
certain objection, and the Parliament is not well situated to initiate litigation except concern-
ing the institutional division of E.U. legislative power. See, e.g., Case C-133/06, Parliament v.
Council, 2008 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 2429 (May 6, 2008).
156. E.C. Treaties, supra note 53, arts. 68, 234.
157. Id. art. 68.
158. See Reform Treaty, supra note 85.
159. Procedures Directive, supra note 59, art. 44.
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E.C. law.' 60 The resulting complex interaction between that Directive, the
Reception Directive, and the Refugee Convention lies beyond the sole
competence of a Member State court, and no court has yet explored it
fully. An argument that Reception Directive Article 7 cannot sanction
restricting the movement of lawfully present refugees within the asylum-
seeking population within the host State, and that asylum seekers with
pendant claims are lawfully present, raises issues of purely E.C. law and
should thus require reference to the ECJ.
B. Interpretation ofArticle 7 of the Reception Directive
The Reception Directive is one part of an integrated E.U. asylum
system. The ECJ has the competence, and the duty, to address not only
the components of this system, but their interactions. 161In evaluating the
range of permissible interpretations of the Reception Directive's provi-
sions on free movement and residence, the ECJ should consider the
general backdrop of treaties and other international law, but should also
pay particular attention to the need to maintain a consistent interpretation
of the measures that constitute E.U. asylum law.
At the same time, Title IV of the E.C. Treaty gives prominence to the
Refugee Convention as a source of European law.16 Arguably, portions
of these particular E.C. measures are thus best seen as a set of instruc-
tions for Member States to follow in implementing an existing body of
law, the regime implied in the Refugee Convention, rather than as them-
selves the source of the Member States' legal obli 63 Wseles he oure  e   tte  alobligations . ere an
asylum seeker such as Mr. Omwenyeke to successfully arrive at the ECJ,
he could ask the court to declare that refugees registered as asylum seek-
ers are lawfully present, that the Reception Directive cannot be read to
sanction violations of a Member State's obligations under international
law, and that, therefore, enforcing the Residenzpflicht places Germany in
violation of its obligations toward refugees under E.U. law.
160. Id. art. 7(l)
161. See E.C. Treaties, supra note 53, art. 225(3) (permitting the Court of First Instance
to refer a case to the ECJ for a ruling if the case "requires a decision of principle likely to
affect the unity or consistency of Community law").
162. Id. art. 63(l).
163. See Hugo Storey, EU Refugee Qualification Directive: A Brave New World?, 20
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 1, 11-12 (2008). Although Storey limited his use of this concept to the
refugee definition as detailed in the Qualification Directive, the same line of reasoning would
apply to those portions of the Reception Directive, such as Article 7, that purport to give in-
struction as to how to implement rules that are already outlined in the Refugee Convention. To
allow the Reception Directive to displace a provision of the Convention would "give rise to the
illogical phenomenon of a 'disappearing Refugee Convention"' just as surely as would the
Qualification Directive if it sought to replace the core definition of a refugee. Id. at 12.
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Even while the plain language of Article 7 of the Reception Direc-
tive appears to admit restrictions on residence and movement as
described in the Residenzpflicht, permitting the exercise of those restric-
tions would raise inconsistencies within the developing body of E.U.
asylum law. When its transposition deadline passed in December 2007,'6
the Procedures Directive took direct effect, establishing it as a source of
enforceable law throughout the European Union.' 65 The Procedures Di-
rective confers on people admitted into the asylum process an
unambiguous right to remain in the Member State evaluating the applica-
tion.166 A legally enforceable right to remain appears to supply a strong
indication that an asylum seeker's presence in the European Union is
"lawful," especially when "lawfulness" is evaluated in the specific con-
text of refugee law. The Reception Directive can only permit the
Residenzpflicht if it may sanction a violation of Convention Articles 26
and 3 1.167 Such an interpretation would represent a surprising departure
from first principles of E.U. law, yet denying "lawful" presence would
imply inconsistency between the two Tampere directives.' 68 Neither
course looks particularly appealing to the ECJ, tasked as it is with main-
taining clarity and consistency in interpreting measures enacted under
the E.C. treaties.
Similarly, reading Article 7 of the Reception Directive alongside the
Qualification Directive and the Refugee Convention leaves little room to
base future jurisprudence on the Constitutional Court's rulings in support
of the Residenzpflicht. The Constitutional Court's view that "lawful
presence" begins only on formal recognition of refugee status can only
be reconciled with the existence of a meaningful distinction between
"lawfully in" and "lawfully staying" if a refugee can be deemed "law-
fully staying" at some subsequent point. Yet, the Qualification Directive,
duly transposed into German law, requires granting a renewable resi-
dence permit valid for at least three years "as soon as possible" after
refugee status is recognized. 69 In Convention terms, a refugee in posses-
164. Procedures Directive, supra note 59, art. 44.
165. See, e.g., BATTJES, supra note 57, at 540-42.
166. See Procedures Directive, supra note 59, art. 7(1) ("Applicants shall be allowed to
remain in the Member State, for the sole purpose of the procedure, until the determining au-
thority has made a decision .... This right to remain shall not constitute an entitlement to a
residence permit.").
167. If Article 31(2) were invoked in defense of the Residenzpflicht, the ECJ would need
to consider whether the movement restrictions that it allows can be considered "necessary" in
a situation that did not trigger the invocation of the Temporary Protection Directive.
168. Compare Reception Directive, supra note 12, with Procedures Directive, supra note
59.
169. Qualification Directive, supra note 60, art. 24.
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sion of such a permit is "lawfully staying"' 70 and furthermore probably
has reached a level of durable residence that would require the provision
of an additional, albeit small, set of social rights. 7 ' The Qualification
Directive reinforces this in its social rights chapter, by requiring that
rights pertaining to "lawfully staying" status under the Refugee Conven-
tion be extended to refugees immediately upon recognition.17 By
implication, refugees governed by the pre-recognition regime of the Re-
ception Directive were "lawfully present" just prior to their recognition
as refugees under the Qualification Directive. Any other interpretation
would conflate the meaning of these two distinct, carefully used terms.
Whether it comports with the German Basic Law or infringes the ECHR,
either enforcing the Residenzpflicht places Germany in violation of its
international obligations as a Member State of the European Union, or
the distinction that the Convention makes between a refugee "lawfully
present" and one "lawfully staying" collapses.
In resolving the apparent conflicts and inconsistencies that would re-
sult from using Reception Directive Article 7 to sanction the restrictions
on movement and residence imposed pursuant to the Residenzpflicht, it
is important to maintain a clear distinction between the means used to
interpret E.U. law, and those employed in interpreting international trea-
ties. The Tampere measures, and the E.C. Treaty provisions that
authorized them, exist within the E.U. legal order, and are therefore sub-
ject to ECJ interpretation.' By contrast, the Refugee Convention plays a
significant role in defining the permissible boundaries of E.U. asylum
170. See HATHAWAY, supra note 5, at 186-87 (noting that, according to the Refugee
Convention, "lawfully staying" is indicated by at least a period of continuous, tolerated stay in
the host State, regardless of formal recognition as a refugee). Securing a three-year residence
permit following a stay in the host State during the asylum procedure considerably exceeds
this measure.
171. See id. at 190. Refugees recognized under the Qualification Directive are entitled to
a three-year residence permit. Qualification Directive, supra note 60, art. 24(1). The impres-
sion that this must reflect at least "lawfully staying" status is reinforced by the indication of an
identical three-year period for the Convention rights that attach even beyond "lawfully stay-
ing," when the refugee reaches "durable residence" in the host State. HATHAWAY, supra note
5, at 190. That these three years accrue toward a permanent right of residence in the European
Union, according to the Long Term Residence Directive, further indicates that, according to
E.U. law, a recognized refugee stands but one stage short of durable residence, i.e., is "law-
fully staying" in the host Member State. Council Directive 2003/109, arts. 3, 4, 2003 O.J. (L
16) 44 (EC). The language excluding people who "are refugees or have applied for recognition
as refugees and whose application has not yet given rise to a final decision" from the scope of
this Directive seems also to imply that E.U. law recognizes the declarative nature of refugee
status and that a person can be a refugee prior to official recognition of that fact. Id. art. 3(d).
172. Compare Refugee Convention, supra note 1, arts. 17 (wage-earning employment),
21 (housing), 23 (public relief), 28 (international travel documents), with Qualification Direc-
tive, supra note 60, arts. 26 (employment generally), 31 (access to accommodation), 28 (social
welfare), 25(1) (international travel documents).
173. E.C. Treaties, supra note 53, art. 220.
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measures, but the meaning of that Convention exists autonomously, in
international rather than E.U. law. 74 Yet, the Convention and the Tampere
measures are so tightly intertwined as likely to render it impossible for
the ECJ to resolve an inconsistency such as that between Article 7 of the
Reception Directive and the rights guaranteed by the Refugee Conven-
tion without drawing substantive conclusions as to the meaning-or
range of permissible meanings-of that Convention.
Lacking an international tribunal to which to refer such interpretive
questions, the ECJ should take a broad approach to reading the Refugee
Convention, considering not only E.U. Member State but also interna-
tional jurisprudence. That line of analysis leads unavoidably to the
conclusion that once lawful presence is established, a signatory State
may not restrict the general movement of refugees within its territory.
7
As discussed above, in the European Union, the interactions between the
Tampere directives evidence lawful presence. 76 The Procedures Direc-
tive confers a right to remain on filing an asylum application,' 77 the
Reception Directive requires the provision of identity documents that
further evidence lawful presence,7 7 and the Convention binds States to
respect certain rights, including the right to free movement within the
host State.'79 The Reception Directive may not support a minimum stan-
dard that allows a Member State to maintain a legal regime that violates
its international human rights obligations, particularly when those obli-
gations are spelled out in a treaty referenced not only in the E.U. law in
question, but also in the foundational treaties of the European Union.'80
The Reception Directive exists unambiguously within a developing
Common European Asylum System "based on the full and inclusive ap-
plication" of the Refugee Convention.'8 ' The ECJ maintains its own lines
of jurisprudence and rules of interpretation, but, particularly in asylum
matters, must keep in view the broader requirements of international and
European law. ' Member States cannot lawfully implement the lowest
174. See, e.g., R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Adan & Aitseguer, [2001]
2 A.C. 477 (H.L.) (U.K.) (opinion of Lord Steyn) (stating that "[ilt is necessary to determine
the autonomous meaning of the relevant treaty provision" in interpreting the Refugee Conven-
tion).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 106-107.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 172-174.
177. Procedures Directive, supra note 59, art. 7(1).
178. Reception Directive, supra note 12, art. 6. It is important to keep in mind, however,
that lawful presence and lawful stay are defacto established. Registration in the asylum proc-
ess, receipt of a residence permit, and even recognition as a long-term E.U. resident are
merely evidence-albeit powerful positive evidence-of a lawful status.
179. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 26.
180. E.C. Treaties, supra note 53, art. 63(l).
181. Reception Directive, supra note 12, pmbl. para. 2.
182. See, e.g., Case C-540/03, Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. 1-5769.
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minimum standards of free movement for asylum seekers that the Re-
ception Directive requires, as those standards lie below the minimum
requirements of enforceable human rights that prevail in the European
Union today. The human rights law of the European Union has devel-
oped to the point where it no longer permits the Residenzpflicht, and the
Europeanization of asylum law has given the ECJ the competence to
make this clear. 3
V. CONCLUSION: CAN THE ECJ EXPAND
REFUGEE RIGHTS IN GERMANY?
If there is a path to bring the Residenzpflicht before the ECJ, it is
narrow and obstacle-strewn. The ECJ's jurisdiction over asylum is cur-
rently so truncated that the potential for European enforcement against
Germany of Refugee Convention rights to free movement is largely illu-
sory. Although it remains open to Member States' courts to simply
enforce the Refugee Convention over and above laws implementing Re-
ception Directive Article 7, realistically the space between the
Convention and the Directive has led to a risk that those courts will en-
force laws that fall short of the Refugee Convention.
Since the transposition of the Reception Directive, no E.U. State has
seen fit to take advantage of the terms in Article 7 that purport to sanc-
tion the Residenzpflicht, despite the fact that several other E.U. States
formally share governmental responsibilities among their administrative
regions.)8 Presently, the legislators of the European Union have an op-
portunity to nudge German practice toward closer compliance with the
Refugee Convention. The European Commission has tabled amendments
to the Reception Directive for consideration by the Council and Parlia-
ment. 85 While this Directive is by no means the most complex or legally
fraught of the European Union's asylum instruments-both of those du-
bious honors probably belong to the Asylum Procedures Directive-it
does encompass its fair share of difficult and controversial topics. Arti-
cle 7, however, could be brought closer to the Directive's aspired-for
183. If this would seem a surprising advance by the ECJ into the territory of its German
colleague, it is worth recalling that fulfilling the Amsterdam Treaty requires a long-term and
ongoing shift in competence over asylum law.
184. The Belgian Federation, the legislative and administrative powers devolved on
Scotland, and the Spanish regions supply a few examples. See De Belgische Grondwet [Con-
stitution], ch. IV (BeIg.); Constituci6n [C.E.] art. 143 (Spain); Scotland Act 1998, 1998 c.46
(U.K.).
185. Questions and Answers Press Release, supra note 15.
186. See e.g., Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR Regrets Missed Opportunity to Adopt
High EU Asylum Standards (Apr. 30, 2004), http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/40921f4
e4.html.
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"full and inclusive application" of the Refugee Convention simply by
amending it to more closely reflect the language of Articles 26 and 31 of
the Refugee Convention.87
With only a little imagination, the European Union and Germany can
devise a system that allows States the flexibility to distribute administra-
tive responsibilities as they see fit, while nonetheless assuring a "full and
inclusive application" of Articles 26 and 31 of the Refugee Conven-
tion."' Eliminating the Residenzpflicht, an outlier among the asylum
practices of the Member States, would advance the harmonization of
E.U. asylum law, and, most importantly, would restore to refugees in
Germany a set of legally binding rights denied for more than a quarter of
a century.
187. The Commission's amendment proposal goes part of the way, as it would eliminate
Article 7(3) and, with it, apparently, the possibility to argue that laws such as Asylum Proce-
dure Act § 63(3) permit the discretionary restriction of asylum seekers "for legal reasons or
reasons of public order." Asylum Procedure Act, supra note 7, § 63(3). The proposal would
not affect Articles 7(1) or 7(2), apparently leaving to the judiciary the question of how to rec-
oncile those provisions with international law that forbids such restrictions of refugees' rights
to choice of residence and free movement.
188. Reception Directive, supra note 12, pmbl. para. 2.
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